In this paper, we develop a model in which risk-averse investors trade on private information regarding both a stock's expected payo¤ and risk. These investors may trade in the stock and a derivative whose payo¤ is a function of the stock's risk. We study the role played by the derivative, …nding that it is used to speculate on future risk and to hedge risk uncertainty. Unlike prior rational expectation models with derivatives, its price serves a valuable informational role, communicating investors' risk information. Finally, we …nd that the equity risk premium is directly tied to the derivative price.
Introduction
Trade in derivatives whose values depend upon their underlying's risk, such as variance swaps, is on the rise. Investors appear to trade in these derivatives to speculate on private information regarding their underlying's volatility, and, as a result, their prices play a valuable informational role in the economy, communicating investors' information about risk.
For example, ETFs tracking the VIX are now among the most actively traded securities in the market; trading volume in these ETFs is converging to that in the underlying S&P index itself. Furthermore, the price of the VIX has been termed the economy's "fear gauge," serving as a measure of the market's beliefs regarding macroeconomic risk. 1 Yet, trade in and pricing of these securities are di¢ cult to explain using traditional models of trade based on private information (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ), which assume that investors are perfectly aware of securities'risk. As a result, these models …nd that derivatives play only a risk-sharing role and that their equilibrium prices do not provide investors with information (Brennan and Cao (1996) , Vanden (2006) ). In this paper, we demonstrate the more active role played by derivative securities in a model in which risk-averse investors trade on private information on both the expected payo¤ and the risk of a stock.
In our model, investors face uncertainty regarding both the mean and variance of an equity's payo¤s and possess diverse private information on each of these components, i.e., they each possess both "mean" and "risk" information. In particular, the "mean" information received by investors informs them regarding the …rst moment, or location parameter, of the equity's payo¤s, while their "risk" information informs them regarding the second moment, or dispersion parameter, of the equity's payo¤s. In addition to trading in the equity, investors may trade in a security whose payo¤ is exclusively a function of the riskiness of 1 Support for these statements is found throughout the …nancial press. For example, see The Fearless Market Ignores Perils Ahead (April 2017, Financial Times), which discusses cases in which the VIX has been used to speculate on future risk and discusses the recent uptick in trade in the VIX. See also The Snowballing Power of the VIX, Wall Street's Fear Index (June 2017, Wall Street Journal), which states, "Invented 24 years ago as a way to warn investors of an imminent crash, the VIX has morphed into a giant casino of its own."Finally, note that VIX open interest reached an all-time peak of close to 700,000 contracts in February 2017. See https://ycharts.com/indicators/cboe_vix_futures_open_interest. the equity, which we refer to as a variance derivative. This security is meant to capture trade in derivatives such as variance swaps whose value increases in volatility. 2 Our goal is to examine how investors trade on their two types of information in equilibrium and the role played by price of the variance derivative.
To begin, we study where investors trade on mean and risk information when they have access to both securities. We …nd that uncertainty over the equity's risk a¤ects how investors trade on their information regarding expected payo¤s. Prior models of trade with known equity risk demonstrate that investors trade on their beliefs about a stock's expected payo¤s in equities but not derivatives (Brennan and Cao (1996) , Cao and Ou-Yang (2009)). On the other hand, in the face of risk uncertainty, the variance derivative serves as a form of insurance against ‡uctuations in the riskiness of the stock's payo¤s. When the riskiness of the stock's payo¤s is high, a risk-averse investor who holds an equity position has heightened marginal utility with respect to their wealth. 3 Therefore, they have a desire to "hedge"
by purchasing a security that pays o¤ when equity risk is high; the variance derivative …lls precisely this role. As a result, investors with optimistic mean information purchase the equity and hedge their positions by holding the variance derivative. Empirically, such hedging resembles the common practice of using derivatives as portfolio insurance, that is, taking positions in derivatives such as the VIX to protect against large losses. 4 Next, we study the information provided by the prices of the equity and derivative securities in equilibrium. The model demonstrates that there is an additional driver of trade in the variance derivative that is not associated with trade in the equity market: trade on risk information. One might expect that a risk-averse investor with private information that suggests an equity is risky would downsize their position in this equity. However, in our model, this is not the case: instead, they hold their equity position …xed and purchase the variance derivative. Intuitively, when the investor trades on risk information in the derivative, the only risk they face is that their information signal regarding the equity's risk is inaccurate.
If the investor were to trade on risk information in the equity itself, they would face both the risk that their information is inaccurate and the risk that the equity price moves against them. In sum, there are two components to the investor's demand in the variance derivative:
a risk-uncertainty hedging component and a speculative risk-information component. Thus, unlike prior rational expectations models with known risk, our model suggests the derivative price serves a valuable informational role, enabling investors to learn about the underlying's risk. This suggests, for instance, that by serving as the economy's "fear gauge,"the price of the VIX may in fact guide investors'trading decisions. 5 Finally, we study how the price of the variance derivative is related to the equity price and trading volume in the two markets. The model suggests that the price of the variance derivative directly enters the risk premium in the equity market. Intuitively, the price of this derivative re ‡ects the cost to hedging the risk uncertainty induced by a position in the equity. Therefore, when the derivative price is higher, investors are more reluctant to hold the equity, such that its risk premium rises. Moreover, a higher derivative price also leads to a reduction in trade in the equity and derivative markets. The reason is that investors become less willing to speculate on their information regarding expected payo¤s when it is more costly to hedge the risk uncertainty that results from an equity position. Unlike prior rational expectations models that suggest disagreement amongst investors is not priced (Banerjee (2011), Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2012)), 6 our model predicts that disagreement regarding the security's expected payo¤s reduces its equity price and increases derivative prices. The intuition is as follows. Investors'desires to hedge their equity positions in the derivative rise in the magnitude of their equity positions: both investors who are short and investors who are long the equity are exposed to variance risk and wish to utilize the derivative to hedge this risk. Since belief dispersion creates variation in investors' equity positions, this causes an increase in the demand for, and thus the price of, the derivative.
Again, as the derivative price is directly related to the risk premium in the equity market, this increase in the derivative price leads to a decrease in the equity price. 6 The analysis in Banerjee (2011) states that belief dispersion will increase expected returns in a noisy rational expectations setting. Note, however, that this is only the case when belief dispersion is created through a change in the precision of investors' information (see Proposition 1 of his paper). That is, the analysis he considers is not a ceteris paribus modi…cation of belief dispersion, but rather, a change in the underlying information structure that creates belief dispersion. In his model, a ceteris paribus modi…cation of belief dispersion would have no impact on prices: he states, "investor disagreement does not a¤ect prices (while the average beliefs do) (pg. 38)." Finally, variance swaps (and other securities whose payo¤s increase in systematic volatility, including options) are priced at a premium, termed the variance risk premium (VRP) (e.g., Carr and Wu (2009) ). In our model, a VRP may arise due to investors'desire to hedge risk uncertainty in the derivative market. In line with empirical evidence that demonstrates the size of the VRP predicts future equity returns (Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009)), our model predicts a deterministic relation between the VRP and future equity returns, as the cost to hedging the risk uncertainty induced by an equity position rises in the VRP.
Moreover, we predict that dispersion in investors' equilibrium beliefs regarding expected future cash ‡ows increases the VRP. Finally, we predict that the variance risk premium is negatively correlated with trading volume in the stock and derivative markets.
Related Literature. Prior rational expectations models have studied trade in options (Brennan and Cao (1996) , Cao (1999) , Vanden (2006) ). In these models, options complete the market when investors have heterogenous information quality. However, investors take deterministic positions in options based on the precision of their information relative to the average precision of all investors and derivative prices provide no information to investors.
There are two key di¤erences between these papers and ours: …rst, these models focus on the case in which the riskiness of the securities'cash ‡ows is known and the information possessed by investors orders their posteriors in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. 7 Second, while these papers study options, which are a¤ected by both the expected payo¤ to the underlying and its risk, the derivative in our model pays o¤ purely as a function of risk. 8 Relatedly, Chabakauri, Yuan, and Zachariadis (2016) study a rational expectations model in which investors may trade in a full set of contingent claims, again …nding that derivative securities are informationally irrelevant due to the assumptions placed on the type of information possessed by investors. 7 While some prior literature has examined rational expectations models with non-normal distributions, and hence, signals that lead to updating on moments other than the …rst, even in these frameworks, signals order the posterior distributions in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance (e.g., Breon-Drish (2015a), Vanden (2008) ). 8 Nevertheless, note that in these prior models, investors use options to create a quadratic position in the underlying equity payo¤. Thus, options are e¤ectively used to create a payo¤ that increases in risk.
Another set of models has studied trade in options when investors disagree over the mean and/or variance of future cash ‡ows (but face no uncertainty over the variance) ( O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Nandi (2000) ). Most similar to our paper, Cherian and Jarrow (1998) and Nandi (2000) study models of strategic trade in which an investor possesses risk information and trades in options. Note that because strategic investors are risk neutral in these models, uncertainty over risk has no impact on the equity price and a¤ects options only through its impact on their expected payo¤s. Consequently, these models have no role for the derivative as a hedging instrument and, unlike our model, …nd no relationship between the equity and derivative prices.
Other models o¤er non-information related reasons for why investors trade derivatives.
For example, Leland (1980) demonstrates that derivative demand may arise from the relationship between investors' risk aversion and their wealth, and Franke, Stapleton, and
Subrahmanyam (1998) demonstrate that derivative demand may result from unhedgable background risks. As we abstract from these forces, it is important that these other forces be taken into consideration in testing our model. Finally, our model is related to the rational expectations literature that studies information spillovers when investors face uncertainty about multiple components of a securities'risk and may trade in correlated securities (Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014), Goldstein and Yang (2015) ). We contribute to this literature by considering the case in which one component of a securities'risk is related to its variance.
Baseline Model

Assumptions
The model that we analyze is a one-period model of trade, in the spirit of Hellwig (1980) and Breon-Drish (2015a). As is typical, we assume that the economy is populated by a unit continuum of informed investors indexed on [0; 1] with CARA utility u (W ) = e W and with wealth normalized to zero. Investors have access to a risk-free asset with payo¤ normalized to one that is in unlimited supply. Furthermore, they trade in a risky asset (the stock, or equity) that pays o¤ a one-time dividend ofx at the end of the period, with percapita supply of z. We refer to the i th trader's position in the stock as D Si . There are three novel assumptions in the model. First, both the mean and variance of the stock's payo¤s are unknown to investors: given the realizations of two independent random variables,~ andṼ ,x is normally distributed with mean~ and varianceṼ :xj~ ;Ṽ N ~ ;Ṽ . It is natural to assume that the mean parameter is also Gaussian:~ N m; 2 . However, as V must be non-negative, it cannot be Gaussian; we allowṼ to take any distribution with a non-negative support
The second novel assumption of the model is that investors separately possess both "mean" information and "risk" information. Clearly, private information regarding~ concerns the stock's expected payo¤, while private information regardingṼ concerns the stock's risk. All informed traders receive information signals regarding~ andṼ and traders rationally use the stock and derivative prices as additional signals. 9 The "mean"signal received by investor i equals' i =~ +ñ +" i whereñ
10
The noise termsñ,~ ," i , andẽ i are independent of the other variables in the model. Note that in the standard normal prior, normal likelihood set up found throughout the rational expectations literature, the variance of cash ‡ows falls by a deterministic quantity that depends upon investors' information quality. By allowing investors to receive a signal that directly concerns the variance of cash ‡ows, in our model, investors' posterior variance is now a random function that depends on the realized signal~ i .
The …nal novel assumption is that investors also trade a third security that has payo¤s equal to the stochastic variance,Ṽ , 11 with per-capita supply of zero. It is natural that in the presence of an additional source of risk in the stock's payo¤s and heterogenous information regarding this risk, a market would develop to trade the risk. We refer to this security as a variance derivative and refer to the i th trader's position in the derivative as D Di . The increase in market completeness obtained by the introduction of this security allows for the construction of a closed-form equilibrium stock price and investor demands conditional on P D , which enables the study of several applications. In its absence, investors' demand functions can only be characterized implicitly. Moreover, in the absence of the variance derivative, investors would bet on both mean and risk in a single security, the stock, causing its price to re ‡ect two distinct pieces of information; this would lead to a complex statistical updating problem.
Our approach to modeling the derivative deviates from prior literature, which studies derivatives with option-like payo¤s, or payo¤s that are a quadratic or logarithmic function of returns (Brennan and Cao (1996) , Vanden (2006) , Cao and Ou-Yang (2009)). In contrast, 10 Note that while signals regardingṼ may be negative, which may seem to contradict the fact that variances are non-negative, a signal~ i is informationally equivalent to any signal g (~ i ) where g is invertible.
Hence, we could de…ne instead de…ne the signal as~ 0 i = e~ i to obtain a signal which always takes on non-negative values. 11 It is simple to accomodate the case in whichỹ also pays out the …xed component of the unconditional variance ofx, 2 , but this adds complexity to the expressions for price and demand while o¤ering no additional insight.
we assume that the derivative security's pay o¤ equals the structural variance that generates the stock's payo¤s. This raises the question of what such a security represents. We o¤er two interpretations. Most clearly, the variance derivative may be seen as a variance swap (e.g., VIX), i.e., a security that pays o¤ proportional to the realized variance of its underlying's returns, de…ned as the sum-of-squared daily returns. Intuitively, if investors periodically receive noisy information regarding future cash ‡ows, a higher underlying cash ‡ow risk should manifest as variance in returns. To see this in a simple framework, consider an extension of the model in which the security's dividend is equal to the sum of N i.i.d. 
where P i N is the price of the security in the N th period. Then, we have that:
Taking the limit as N approaches in…nity, such that investors continuously receive very small amounts of information regarding the terminal dividend, this converges toṼ , i.e., the payo¤ to a variance swap as of the initial trading date, SSR, is precisely proportional toṼ .
Second, the variance derivative may be viewed as a heuristic approximation to a "zerodelta" option position such as a straddle, i.e., an option position that is a¤ected by the magnitude but not direction of the price movement. Despite the fact that their payo¤s are de…ned as a function of realized price, the expected payo¤s to positions such as straddles and strangles increase in the riskiness of the stock's payo¤s,Ṽ . Hence, by modelling the derivative's payo¤ as simply equal toṼ , we capture the essential element that the expected 12 Notice that for simplicity of exposition, the mean ofx has been set to a known constant of zero.
payout to the derivative is greater when the variance of the stock's payo¤s is larger. Ni et al.
(2008) o¤er an empirical measure that corresponds to this interpretation of the derivative, measuring volatility-based trade in option positions by controlling for their sensitivity to directional price movements in their underlyings. 13 In order to close the model and prevent the stock price from fully revealing investors' information, we introduce noise into the model by assuming that the investors have exogenous endowments of the two stochastic components relevant to the asset,~ andṼ . This is a natural extension of the assumption made in prior work such as Wang (1994) and Schneider (2009) to the case in which there are two traded assets with two independent sources of risk. Formally, assume that the endowment of trader i in~ is equal toZ i =z +z i wherẽ
and assume that the endowment of trader i inṼ is
. Assume that the endowments fz ;z V ;z i ;z V i g are independent of each other and the other variables in the model.
Equilibrium
We begin by characterizing a rational expectations equilibrium. Denote by P S the equilibrium price of the stock and by P D equal the equilibrium price of the derivative. Let
We analyze the standard de…nition of a rational expectations equilibrium:
De…nition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair of functions P S ; P D such that investors choose their demands to maximize their utility conditional on their information 13 We note that the model accomodates the case in which the derivative has both "delta" and "vega." First, note that a security with both delta and vega can be roughly approximated by taking a position in both the equity and derivative in my model. Second, suppose that the derivative payo¤ was instead linear inx as well asṼ , i.e., its pay o¤ was x + Ṽ for some 2 < and > 0. In this case, the expression for the equity price would be materially unchanged as a result of the fact that the derivative is, on average, in zero net supply. However, trading volume in the asset would be a function of investors'risk information, as they would trade in the asset to neutralize the delta provided by a position in the derivative. The derivative price would equal P S + P D where P S and P D are the equity and derivative prices in our model, respectively. set:
2 arg max
and, in all states, markets clear:
To derive the equilibrium, we proceed in three steps: (i) we solve for equity demands and the equity price for a …xed derivative price; (ii) we solve for the derivative demands and derivative price for …xed equity demands; (iii) we combine the two markets to show that there exists a rational expectations equilibrium, which solves a …xed point problem.
Note that given the equilibrium de…nition, the investors'demands in the stock and derivative are allowed to depend on both the derivative price and the stock price. As a result, it is possible that the stock and derivative prices each contain information on both~ andṼ .
We specialize slightly further in the equilibria we consider. In particular, we consider only equilibria in which the derivative price does not reveal any information incremental to the stock price regarding~ and the stock price does not reveal any information incremental to the derivative price regardingṼ . Technically, we take the following approach. Let F P S ( ) represent the distribution function of P S and F P D ( ) represent the distribution function of P D . We conjecture an equilibrium in which the derivative price is conditionally independent of~ given the stock price, i.e., F P D ( jP S ;~ ) = F P D ( jP S ) and the stock price is conditionally independent ofṼ given the derivative price, i.e., F P S jP D ;Ṽ = F P S ( jP D ). This implies that investors use the stock price to update on expected payo¤s and the derivative price to update on the riskiness of payo¤s. We then show that given such a conjecture, the equilibrium stock price and derivative price indeed satisfy F P D ( jP S ;~ ) = F P D ( jP S ) and
, demonstrating the existence of such an equilibrium. In fact, one needs only to conjecture that one of these two properties holds, and the other will follow in equilibrium. However, we have not been able to rule out the possibility of other equilibria.
Beginning with the stock market, we follow the standard procedure of conjecturing a linear equilibrium,
where, by the conjecture that F P S jP D ;Ṽ = F P S ( jP D ),~ 0 may depend uponṼ only through P D , and hence is known to investors. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium equity demands and equity price for a given derivative price P D . In the appendix, we derive expressions for 0 , , and z .
Proposition 1
The investors'equity demands and the equilibrium equity price given a derivative price P D satisfy:
To understand the expression for investors' demands, note that in the classical meanvariance framework with known variance and no derivative security, their demands would equal their expected payo¤ less price divided by the variance, less their endowment:
In the present setting, we again have a numerator equal to the expected payo¤ minus price and the investors'demands are adjusted for their endowment of~ . However, the denominator, which captures the investor's adjustment for risk, is now modi…ed as there are two components of risk when trading in the stock: that of the uncertain mean,~ , and the stochastic variance,Ṽ . As is the case in the classical framework, the variance of the uncertain mean component is added to the denominator since it follows a normal distribution.
On the other hand, to account for the riskiness of the stochastic varianceṼ , the denominator includes the price of the derivative security P D , which in general is not simply equal to expected risk E Ṽ .
To provide an intuition for why investors discount the risk associated withṼ at the price of the derivative security, consider investor i's expected utility conditional onṼ when their demands are (D Si ; D Di ) and their outside endowments are zero:
Notice that the investor's expected utility is decreasing in a linear combination of the payo¤ to their derivative position, D Di Ṽ P D , and the riskiness of the equity position, D As a result, the exposure toṼ created by a position in the stock,
SiṼ can e¤ectively be hedged by taking a position in the derivative, which comes at the price of P D . When P D rises, this exposure becomes costlier to hedge, and hence, investors will treat the stock as though it were riskier. The proof provided in the appendix demonstrates that this intuition continues to hold upon taking the expectation overṼ and upon accounting for investors' random endowments.
Importantly, the equity demands D Si are not directly a function of investors'risk signals i , given the conjecture that
Thus, despite the fact that investors' risk signals provide them with information regarding the riskiness of the stock, they choose not to take into account these signals~ i when trading in the stock market. As a result, the conjecture that the stock price is informationally redundant with respect toṼ is veri…ed.
Note that the following corollary does not imply that the stock market and derivative markets function independently. Instead, the corollary only states that investors' risk information can only a¤ect the equity price through the price of the derivative, P D .
Corollary 1
The stock price is informationally redundant with respect toṼ . That is,
With the equilibrium in the stock market established, now consider the equilibrium derivative price for …xed equity demands, fD Si g i2[0;1] . As the distribution of a variance must be bounded below by zero, the distribution of the payo¤ of the derivative cannot be assumed normal. To make the model as general as possible, we allow for an arbitrary distribution of V . In order to derive the rational expectations equilibrium in this general case, we apply the approach of Breon-Drish (2015b), summarized below. This implies that the distribution ofṼ given ~ i ;l;Z V i falls into the exponential family of distributions with the following form: 
where
and a are de…ned in the appendix. The equilibrium derivative price P D may be written:
for a function r ( ) de…ned in the appendix. P D is positive, increasing inṼ and~ , and decreasing inz V .
Critically, investors'derivative demands contain a new component that reveals an important interaction between the two markets. In particular, investor i's demand is increasing in the square of their position in the stock,
Si . This arises from the investors'desire to hedge risk uncertainty: since the investors'utility functions have a positive third derivative, they prefer skewed payo¤ distributions (Kimball (1990) ). By purchasing the derivative, an equity investor has a greater level of wealth when they face more risk, leading to payo¤ skewness. 14 Note that this hedging component of investors' derivative demands lead both investors who short the stock and investors who long the stock hold positions in the derivative. Moreover, it creates a link between the derivative price and investors'equity demands through the aggregate desire to hedge,
Although investors' equity demands a¤ect the derivative price and these demands are a¤ected by their private information and endowments,' i andZ i , the derivative price is nevertheless informationally redundant with respect to~ . Substituting the equity price in Proposition 1 into investors'equity demands, we …nd that their equity demands are linear 14 See footnote 18 in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) for a discussion of why this holds even for CARA utility, which is generally interpreted as having a preference for risk that is independent of wealth. The notion of preferences across distributions is distinct from the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion, which assesses how much an investor is willing to pay to eliminate a risk at any given wealth level. The Arrow-Pratt measure also takes into account an investor's marginal utility at a given wealth level.
in the di¤erence between their private mean signal (' i ) and the average mean signal (~ ) and in their mean-zero idiosyncratic endowmentsz i . As a result, the aggregate risk-uncertainty hedging demand of informed investors for the derivative, Corollary 2 The derivative price is informationally redundant with respect to~ . That is,
This result also demonstrates that the derivative price would perfectly reveal investors' aggregate risk signal, aggregate hedging demands are una¤ected by~ andz . Speci…cally, notice that expression (9) demonstrates that in the absence of endowment noise,z , we would have
Si di is independent of~ andz , this implies that the derivative price could be inverted to deriveṼ +~ . Now that the two markets have been examined in isolation, taking the price and demands in the other market as …xed, we consider both markets in tandem and show that there exists an equilibrium.
Proposition 3 There exists a rational expectations equilibrium P S ; P D .
The existence of an equilibrium boils down to the existence of a solution to a …xed-point problem; the nature of this problem is depicted in Figure 1 . Expression (5) shows that the aggregate risk-uncertainty hedging demand of investors,
Si di, is a decreasing function of the derivative price, P D . Intuitively, when P D is larger, investors are more reluctant to Figure 1 : This …gure depicts the interplay between the equity and the variance derivative markets, given that the derivative insures against ‡uctuations inṼ induced by a position in the equity. Trade in the equity a¤ects the derivative price through investors' desire to hedge risk uncertainty. This in turn, a¤ects the equity market through the risk premium associated withṼ .
trade on their information because it is costlier to hedge the risk uncertainty that results from a directional equity position. In other words, when P D is higher, the investor is more averse to the variance risk induced by an equity position; we thus refer to this e¤ect in the …gure as the variance risk premium (note we discuss the variance risk premium further in section 2.5). Simultaneously, the derivative price is itself a function of
Si di, such that …nding an equilibrium requires solving for a …xed point P D . Note that as in Wang (1994) and Schneider (2008) , the assumption that noise in the model stems from noisy endowments rather than noise trade works against equilibrium uniqueness; that is, the possibility of multiple equilibria stems purely from the standard assumptions on endowment noise, rather than risk uncertainty, the inclusion of a variance derivative, or risk information. 15 Note that in our model, investors face two components of risk in a single security, the equity. It is insightful to compare our model to prior rational expectations models with multidimensional risk. Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014) study a model in which investors trade in two related securities with a common component a¤ecting the expected returns to both securities. Goldstein and Yang (2015) study a model in which investors have information on two components of a security's cash ‡ow. These papers demonstrate that uncertainty and 15 We have solved the model under the assumption of …xed endowments and noise trade and found a unique equilibrium. However, the required assumptions on the behavior of noise traders to ensure the existence of a tractable equilibrium are ad hoc. learning regarding one factor tends have spillover e¤ects on the other factor. Unlike these papers, the two components of uncertainty in our model a¤ect di¤erent moments of the cash ‡ow distribution. This creates new economic forces that do not appear in the set up in which each component a¤ects expected payo¤s: the realization of investors' information regarding risk a¤ects both the risk premium and investors'trading intensities in the second security. Thus, while Goldstein, Li, and Yang (2014) document that uncertainty regarding one component of cash ‡ows has spillover e¤ects on investors'trading intensities in both markets, our model suggests that the price of the variance derivative itself a¤ects how intensely investors trade on their information and causes the derivative price to enter the equity's risk premium (i.e., cost of capital). These forces are crucial to the applications studied below, leading to relationships between price changes and trading volume in both markets.
Trading volume and price changes
In this section, we analyze the relationships between trading volume and price changes within and across equity and derivative markets. To summarize the results, note that Propositions 1 and 2 reveal three key relationships: i) the risk premium in the equity market increases in the derivative price, ii) investors'willingness to trade on their mean-based information in the equity decreases in the derivative price, and iii) when investors trade more in the equity, they also trade more in the derivative to hedge risk uncertainty. Analyzing these e¤ects jointly, increases in the derivative price and reductions in the equity price are negatively associated with trading volume in the equity and derivative.
Critically, these results are founded on 1) investor risk aversion and 2) a derivative security that pays o¤ purely as a function of its underlyings'volatility. Therefore, they apply most directly to trade in the VIX (and similar securities), which possesses risk that is primarily systematic in nature and pays o¤ purely as a function of realized volatility. However, note that our results also provide insight into option trade that is driven by a demand for exposure to volatility; again this has been measured by controlling for option "delta" (Ni et al. (2008) ).
An empirical literature has studied trade in options versus stocks, arguing that the relative trading volume in each security tends to be driven by concerns for leverage and liquidity 
The next proposition formally characterizes volume in the two markets.
Proposition 4 Trading volume in the stock market is equal to:
and trading volume in the derivative market is equal to:
Volume in the stock market has two components, a component related to speculation on investors'beliefs regarding~ , Note that because the derivative price impacts trading volume in the equity, it also has a spillover e¤ect on trading volume in the derivative market. Since investors' desires to hedge risk uncertainty are driven by their equity positions, a reduction in trade in the equity market also leads to a reduction in the risk-uncertainty hedging component of derivative trade. Therefore, the derivative price P D is negatively associated with trade in both markets.
Finally, because the derivative price enters the equity risk premium, this suggests that the equity price is positively associated with trade in both markets. In sum, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 i) Increases in the derivative price driven by greaterṼ or~ , or smallerz V , changes in the parameters This corollary has immediate implications for the covariance between trading volume in equities and derivatives and price changes in the two markets. Formally, suppose that prior to trade, there exist initial prices P S;0 and P D;0 and de…ne P S P S P S;0 and
Then, we have the following result.
Corollary 4
The statistical relationship between contemporaneous returns in the stock and derivative and trading volume in the two markets can be summarized as follows:
Belief Dispersion and Prices
A well-documented result is that in a perfectly competitive rational expectations equilibrium, only the average expectation of payo¤s across investors and the average precision of investors' beliefs a¤ect expected returns (e.g., Banerjee (2011), Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2012)). beliefs regarding the expectation ofx as follows (e.g., Banerjee (2011)):
Belief Dispersion
Then, upon simplifying
Si di, we …nd that:
i.e., . In sum we have the following proposition: 16 Proposition 5 Holding …xed the precision of investors' beliefs regarding~ , the derivative price P D increases and the expected stock price E (P S ) decreases in the dispersion in investors' equilibrium beliefs regarding the mean ofx, negative betas: when realized market variance is high, returns tend to be low (Carr and Wu (2009)). Alternatively, Bakshi and Madan (2006) argue that the VRP may arise from investors'preferences for higher moments. In line with the latter explanation, in our model, a variance risk premium can arise due to investors' preference for skewness; the variance derivative pays o¤ when risk is high, such that holding the derivative alongside the equity creates positive skewness in the investors' wealth distribution. In our model, the size of this premium is related to the dispersion in investors'beliefs regarding~ , trading volume in 16 Note that we have also solved the model in the case in which investors have exogenous variation in their prior beliefs regarding the mean ofx. Variation in prior beliefs also is priced, unlike in prior models. These results are available upon request. the equity and derivative markets, and the equity price. Note that our model speaks most strongly to index-level variance risk premia, where investors' risk aversion plays a greater role.
Variance Risk Premium
Speci…cally, we de…ne the VRP as 1 times the average over investors'expectations of the dollar returns to the variance derivative, i.e., V RP
This de…nition captures the di¤erence between how investors price the variance derivativeṼ and their average expectation of the future variance. As discussed in section 2.1, the variance derivative's price may be seen as the price of a variance swap. Moreover, the average investor belief regardingṼ , is, unlike the risk premium in the equity market, which tends to be negative, the VRP is generally positive.
First, note that section 2.4 suggests the price of the variance derivative is related to investors'disagreement over~ in equilibrium,
the VRP increases in investors'equilibrium disagreement over~ . Interestingly, this suggests that despite the fact that~ has no direct impact on investors'beliefs regardingṼ , the VRP is a¤ected by investors' private information quality regarding~ ( Intuitively, disagreement regarding~ indirectly lead them to hold di¤erent quantities ofṼ in equilibrium, which a¤ects the VRP. Second, the model implies a negative relationship between the variance risk premium and trading volume in the two markets. In particular, Corollary 4 implies that when the derivative price is higher (corresponding to a higher VRP), investors are more averse to the risk uncertainty that results from a position in the stock market. This makes them less willing to trade on their information regarding~ , such that trading volumes in both the stock and derivative are lower.
Finally, the model also suggests a connection between the variance risk premium and future equity returns, which has been empirically validated (Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) ). This follows trivially from expression (5), which shows that the risk premium in the stock market increases with P D . E¤ectively, both the VRP and the equity price capture investors'aversion to variance uncertainty. In summary, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 i) The variance risk premium increases in investors' belief dispersion regarding~ ,
ii) The variance risk premium is negatively correlated with trading volume in the stock and derivative markets.
iii) The equilibrium equity price decreases one-for-one with increases in the variance risk premium.
As a …nal point, note that the one-for-one relationship between the VRP and the equity price implies that even when driven by noise, increases in the derivative price lead to an increase in the equity risk premium. When investors'noisy endowments ofṼ are greater, they must hold more ofṼ in equilibrium, which causes them to demand a greater VRP. If the investors had mean-variance preferences rather than CARA utility, their demands for the stock would be una¤ected by their endowments inṼ , because the stock has a covariance of zero withṼ : Cov x;Ṽ = 0.
17 17 To see this, note that, applying E (x) = E (~ ) and the independence of~ andṼ , for relationship between trading volume in stock and derivative markets and the respective prices in these two markets. Moreover, it suggests that belief dispersion impacts expected stock returns and derivative prices. Finally, it justi…es the empirically documented negative relationship between the variance risk premium and returns in the stock market and o¤ers predictions on the association between trading volume, information quality, and variance risk premia.
In the current set up of the model, investors have homogenous information quality, which leads to a derivative price that is uninformative regarding investors'information regarding expected equity payo¤s. Preliminary investigation suggests that this will not be the case when investors have heterogenous information quality, since, in this case, the dispersion in their beliefs will be a function of the fundamental~ . It may be interesting, but technically challenging, to study the value of the derivative price to investors when it aggregates both information on the mean of future cash ‡ows and their risk. Furthermore, a weakness of the model is that because the variance distribution is fully general, it is di¢ cult to o¤er much intuition into how the parameters of the variance distribution impact the derivative price.
It may be interesting to study more speci…c distributions of the varianceṼ in order to o¤er more de…nitive comparative statics on the drivers of the derivative price in the model.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Investor i's …rst-order conditions with respect to their equity and derivative demands are equal to:
Under the conjecture that F P D ( jP S ;~ ) = F P D ( jP S ), the derivative price serves no role in updating on~ , and hence, its distribution is irrelevant in determining the posterior distribution of~ given the investors'information. Consequently, upon conditioning on the uncertain varianceṼ , due to the linearity of P S and' i in~ , the investors'belief regardingx is normally distributed:xjṼ ; i N E (xj i ) ; V ar (~ j i ) +Ṽ . Hence, evaluating the expectations in expressions 16 and 17 conditional onṼ yields the following simpli…ed …rst-order conditions:
where:
As we show in the proof of Proposition 2,Ṽ j i lies in the exponential family and thus has a moment-generating function that is de…ned on the reals, i.e., 8t 2 <, E exp tṼ j i <
1. This implies that the order of di¤erentiation and expectation can be interchanged in these two conditions, 1819 which yields the following:
Given that P D is known conditional on i , the second condition implies that:
Substituting this result into the …rst equation in expression (20) and rearranging, we …nd:
18 In particular, let M (t) E exp tṼ j i . We wish to show that
In order to do so, we apply the dominated convergence theorem. We show that, for any sequence ft n g with t n ! t, there exists a function (V ) such that:
and E ( (V )) < 1. To …nd such a (V ), note that the mean value theorem implies that there exists a between t n and t such that:
Now, using the fact that
, and using the fact that the MGF exists for all reals, we have the result. 19 Since we may change the order of di¤erentiation and expectation, and the utility function is concave, the second order condition holds.
Solving for D Si yields:
The condition for market clearing requires that
Solving for P S and using the fact that E (~ j i ) = E (xj i ), we …nd:
In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that there is a unique linear equilibrium price that satis…es this equation.
Proof of Corollary 1. Note that there is no dependence of E (xj i ) on f~ i g i2[0;1] and
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by conjecturing a generalized linear equilibrium, as in Breon-Drish (2015b). Speci…cally, conjecture that price satis…es:
for a constant a to be determined as part of the equilibrium. Given that F P S jP D ;Ṽ =
As 0 > 0, investors can invert the linear statistic l Ṽ +~ ;z V from price, and hence, the information in P D is equivalent
o H (y; a) where:
This implies thatṼ j~ i ;l;Z V i has moment-generating function:
Evaluating the expectation in the investors'…rst-order condition with respect to D Di from expression (20) and simplifying yields:
which yields:
The market-clearing condition is:
Applying the law-of-large numbers and simplifying yields:
In order for this to satisfy our conjecture that price depends onṼ andz V only through the linear statistic l Ṽ +~ ;z V = a Ṽ +~ +z V , we must have thatl =
This is equivalent to
= a. Substituting k 1 (a) and k 3 (a) and simplifying yields the following equilibrium condition:
As this is a cubic equation with positive third-order and constant terms, it has at least one negative solution. Hence, an equilibrium P D is de…ned by:
where a is a solution to equation (35) . Letting r (a ) = (k 2 (a ) + k 3 (a )) 1, we have the result in the statement of the proof. We prove that P D increases inṼ and~ and decreases inz V in the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Corollary 2. Expression (9) shows the only dependence of P D on~ is through the term,
Si di. Moreover, note that:
The term
To see this, note that given the conjectured linear equilibrium and normality of the terms~ ,", 
We have:
Since this is not a function of~ , the conjecture has been veri…ed.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Using the results from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, a rational expectations equilibrium must simultaneously satisfy the following three conditions: 
Note that the …rst condition itself contains a …xed-point problem in the sense that E (xj i )
is a function of P S , which is impacted by investors' demands D Si . We …rst show that …xing P D , there is a unique solution to this …xed-point problem, i.e., there is a unique equilibrium in the equity market given P D . To begin, we derive E (xj i ) and V ar (~ j i ).
Let A Cov(x;P S j' i ;Z i ;P D ) V ar(P S j' i ;Z i ;P D ) . Note that:
E (xj i ) = E xj' i ;Z i ; P D + A P S E P S j' i ;Z i ; P D ,
and V ar ( j i ) = V ar j' i ;Z i ; P D A Cov (x; P S j' i ; Z i ; P D ) .
Substituting, we arrive at a cubic equation in A that is positive when A = 1 and negative when A = 0. This implies the existence of a solution A 2 (0; 1) and hence the existence of a solution to equilibrium condition 1. Next, consider the second and third equilibrium conditions. Notice that:
where B (A )
Thus, we have: . Note that if h ;l has a unique zero, then, by equilibrium condition 2, we can solve for the unique P D .
Hence, we will have proven that there exists a unique rational expectations equilibrium for each solution a to equation (35) that P D increases inṼ and~ and declines inz V completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 4. The proof follows by considering the directional e¤ect of a change in each of the random parameters of the model,z ,z V ,Ṽ , and~ , on P S , P D , V ol S , and V ol D . By examining the comparative statics that are implied by the results of propositions 1, 2, and 4, we …nd that any change in the underlying random variables that causes the stock price to increase causes volume in both markets to either remain constant or increase.
Likewise, any change in an underlying random variable that causes the derivative price to increase leads volume in both markets to remain constant or decrease.
Proof of Proposition 5.
The proof is an application of the implicit-function theorem to the equilibrium condition h P D ;l = 0. Since
From the proof of Corollary 2, we have that:
which clearly increases in Belief Dispersion. Now, given that @h(P D ;l)
is positive. Next, note that:
= E (x) 1 z (E (P D ) + V ar (~ j i )) .
Hence, an increase in Belief Dispersion that leaves V ar (~ j i ) unchanged only a¤ects E (P S ) through P D ; given that P D increases in Belief Dispersion, E (P S ) decreases in Belief Dispersion.
Proof of Proposition 6. i) This follows from the proof of Proposition 5.
ii) Letting P D = R 1 0 E Ṽ j i di + V RP , the proof follows by replicating the proof of Corollary 3 holding …xed
iii) This follows from an examination of expression (5).
